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1 Introduction
The Cournot model is widely used in studies of imperfectly competitive industries.
Its standard version, which is concerned with the case of rms producing a homo-
geneous good with complete information about demand and production costs, has
been extensively studied. However, in the past thirty years a fairly big amount of
research has been dedicated to questions that arise when the information is incom-
plete, i.e., when the rms face uncertain market demand and/or cost functions, and
possibly have di¤erential information about them. (See, e.g., Gal-Or (1985, 1986),
Raith (1996), Sakai (1984, 1985), Shapiro (1986), Vives (1984, 1988, 1999), and Einy
et al (2002, 2003).)
In oligopolies with incomplete information, some of the questions that had been
addressed concern the value of information to a rm (that is, whether and by how
much a rm can benet from receiving additional information), as well as rms
incentives to share information. Naturally, treating these questions requires compar-
isons of the (pure strategy Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium1 outcomes in industries
that di¤er with respect to the information endowments of the rms. The scope of
these exercises is thus limited to classes of industries for which a Cournot equilibrium
exists. Moreover, sharp and general conclusions are hard to obtain unless Cournot
equilibrium is also unique under various information endowments of the rms.
For a complete information oligopoly, there is an extensive literature concerned
with the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium under various assumptions
on the demand and cost functions. A well known and general condition for existence
of equilibrium is found in Novshek (1985), who generalizes earlier results (of, e.g.,
Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977)). More recent developments can be found in Amir
(1996), where equilibrium existence and uniqueness results are established by making
a connection with the theory of supermodular games (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
The issues of existence of Cournot equilibrium in incomplete information oligopolies
have so far been largely bypassed in the literature by making strong assumptions. For
instance, Gal-Or (1985), Vives (1984, 1988), and Raith (1996) assume that the linear
1Henceforth we shall use the expression "Cournot equilibrium" to refer to both the pure strategy
Cournot equilibria of an oligopoly with complete information, and to the pure strategy Bayesian
Cournot equilibria in oligopolies with incomplete information.
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market demand is uncertain, but allow the possibility that negative prices may arise
for large outputs, in order not to break the linearity of the demand function.2 While
negative prices may make sense in some contexts, a model is of a greater appeal if such
a possibility is avoided. As we shall see, even if equilibrium prices are positive, the
mere possibility of negative prices in some states of nature has strategic implications
that are crucial in sustaining equilibrium behavior.3
In other papers (Sakai (1985)), incomplete information is assumed only on rms
linear costs, which again allows to avoid the general problem of equilibrium existence.
In a non-linear setting, Einy et al (2003) derive conditions under which the value of
public information in an oligopoly is either positive or negative, but assume that the
rms are symmetrically informed, which allows to reduce the equilibrium existence
question to that in a complete information oligopoly. The assumption of symmetry
of information, and a reduction to the complete information case that it allows, also
stand behind the existence result of Lagerlöf (2006a). In Einy et al (2002) a categorical
approach is used: it is assumed that an equilibrium exists, and then its properties
are studied.
In this work we ask whether (and when) a Cournot equilibrium exists, and is
unique, in a general oligopoly with di¤erential information. Unfortunately, with
regard to existence our ndings are disappointing: there are simple examples of
duopolies with di¤erential information, including one with linear inverse demand
and cost functions, that possess no Cournot equilibrium (see Examples 1 and 2).4
The reason for the non-existence in these examples lies in that, although the inverse
demand function is well behaved in all states of nature (it is linear in Example 1,
and concave in Example 2, before it reaches zero), the expected payo¤ functions of
rms do not have "nice" properties, such as concavity or submodularity, that would
2In these papers, linearity of the demand function is instrumental in the proofs of existence and
uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium.
3We are not the rst to have noticed the di¤erences brought about by possible negativity of prices.
Malueg and Tsutsui (1998) did that in the case of an ex-ante symmetric linear duopoly, showing
how the requirement that prices be always non-negative a¤ects the known results on feasibility of
information sharing. We will see how the requirement of non-negative prices a¤ects the existence of
Cournot equilibrium in oligopolies with di¤erential information.
4The information structure in these examples is very simple too: one rm is better informed than
the other.
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guarantee equilibrium existence via known theorems. Despite the good behavior of
the demand function when it is positive, once it reaches zero for some level of aggre-
gate output and is forced to stay there for all larger outputs, a discontinuity occurs
in its derivative. As a result, the expected payo¤ functions lose properties conducive
to equilibrium existence.
In contrast, when prices are allowed to become negative, the good behavior of
the demand and cost functions does lead to expected payo¤ functions that are well
behaved, and we obtain existence results (see Theorems 1 and 2) under a variant of
Novshek (1985) condition. There is a simple reason why these results cannot be used,
in general, to deduce equilibrium existence in oligopolies with non-negative prices:
disallowing negative prices changes strategic considerations of the rms, sometimes
in a very signicant way. Specically, we may have an equilibrium in an oligopoly
with (possibly) negative prices, but the moment only non-negative prices are allowed,
it may cease being an equilibrium. One of the rms may nd an incentive to deviate
from its strategy, because if too large an output in one state of nature previously
deterred it from deviating to it5 due to the possibility of negative prices, now that
prices are always non-negative this may be a good move on its part.
Even though the existence of Cournot equilibrium with non-negative prices is a
more scarce phenomenon, we characterize some classes of oligopolies with incomplete
information in which Cournot equilibrium does exist (see Theorem 4 and Corollary
1). The important feature of these classes is the existence of certain thresholds of
output, which no rm will ever desire to exceed, and which guarantee positive prices
in every state of nature if rms adhere to them. (Existence of such thresholds can
be guaranteed if marginal costs of rms increase su¢ ciently fast.) This is exactly
what excludes from the realm of possibilities the scenario described in the end of the
previous paragraph: now every equilibrium of an oligopoly with (possibly) negative
prices will translate into an equilibrium of the oligopoly with non-negative prices.
On the front of uniqueness, it turns out that, even in a simple duopoly, Cournot
equilibrium may not be unique if none of the rms has better information than
5Overproduction in one state of nature may be a potentially good strategy for a rm with a
decient information: it may get negative prots in that state as a result of overproduction, but
in exchange gain big times in some other state of nature in the same information set (where other
rms are producing very little).
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its rival. But if there is at least one rm with a superior information, we establish
uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly with two types of rms, provided
an equilibrium exists (see Theorems 3 and 5).
2 Cournot Oligopoly with Di¤erential Information
Consider an industry where a set of rms, N = f1; 2; :::; ng ; produce a homogeneous
good in uncertain conditions. The uncertainty is described by a probability space
(
;z; ) ; where 
 is a set of states of nature, z is a -eld of subsets of 
; and
 is a probability measure on (
;z) ; which represents the common prior belief of
the rms about the distribution of the realized state of nature: The information of
rms about the state of nature may be asymmetric: the private information of rm
i 2 N is given by a -subeld zi of z: Denote by zi+ the collection of sets in zi with
positive measure:
Before proceeding further, recall that the set of all integrable and z-measurable
functions6, L1 (
;z; ) ; is a Banach space with the norm khk1 
R jh (!)j d (!) : It
can be partially ordered by dening g  h if and only if  (f! j g (!) < h (!)g) = 0:
We will also write g > h whenever  (f! j g (!)  h (!)g) = 0: With the partial
order , every interval [g; h] in L1 (
;z; ) is a complete7 lattice (see Theorem 3 in
Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). The cone of non-negative functions in L1 (
;z; ) will
be denoted by L+1 (
;z; ) : Obviously, all these claims and notations also apply to
L1 (
;zi; ) ; for every i 2 N: Finally, denote by L1 (
;z; ) the set of all bounded
z-measurable functions, and let
L+1 (
;z; )  L1 (
;z; ) \ L+1 (
;z; ) :
If qi (!) denotes the quantity of the good produced by rm i at state ! 2 
; and
Q (!) Pni=1 qi (!) ; then the prot of rm i at ! is given by
i

!;
 
qj (!)
n
j=1

= qi (!)P (!;Q (!))  ci
 
!; qi (!)

;
6Or, more, precisely, the space of equivalence classes of these functions, where two functions that
are equal -almost everywhere are identied.
7By this we mean that for any T  Si; inf T and supT are well dened.
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where P (!; ) is the inverse demand function at !, and ci (!; ) is the cost function
of rm i. The following conditions will be assumed on the inverse demand function
and the cost functions:
(i) P (; 0) 2 L1 (
;z; ) ; and for every ! 2 
 P (!; ) is a non-increasing and
continuous function;
(ii) there exists Q 2 L+1 (
;z; ) such that P (!;Q) = 0 for every ! 2 
 and
every Q  Q (!) : For the sake of convenience, we assume that Q (!) is the minimal
Q-intercept of P ;
(iii) for every ! 2 
 and i 2 N ci (!; ) is a strictly increasing and continuous
function, and ci (; q) 2 L+1 (
;z; ) for every q  0:
An output decision of rm i is summarized by its strategy, i.e., a function qi 2
L+1 (
;zi; ) ; which determines the output qi (!) of i at every state of nature !;
subject to measurability with respect to is private information. Given an n-tuple
q = (qj)
n
j=1 of rmsstrategies, the expected payo¤ of rm i,
i (q) = E
h
i

;  qj ()n
j=1
i
= E

qi ()P (; Q ())  ci
 ; qi () ;
is well dened (with values in [ 1;1)):
An n-tuple q = (qj)
n
j=1 2
Qn
j=1 L
+
1 (
;zj; ) constitutes a Cournot equilibrium
if no rm nds it protable to unilaterally deviate to another strategy, i.e., for every
(qj)
n
j=1 2
Qn
j=1 L
+
1 (
;zj; ) and every i 2 N;
i (q)  i
 
q j qi

; (1)
where (q j qi) stands for the n-tuple of strategies which is identical to q in all but
the ith strategy, which is replaced by qi: This is obviously equivalent to requiring that
E
 
i (; q ()) j A
  E  i  ;  q j qi () j A (2)
for every A 2 zi+; or that
E
 
i (; q ()) j zi
  E  i  ;  q j qi () j zi (3)
when both sides are viewed as functions in L1 (
;zi; ) : (Here E(h() j A) stands for
the expectation of random variable h conditional on event A; and E(h() j zi) stands
for the conditional expectation of h given the eld zi.)
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3 Examples of Industries without a Cournot Equi-
librium
3.1 Example 1: Linear Duopoly
As we shall see in Section 5 (Example 3), if the inverse demand function P (!; ) is
linear on the interval

0; Q (!)

, the duopoly does possess a Cournot equilibrium,
provided the Q-intercept of P is known to both rms at every state of nature; i.e.,
Q is measurable with respect to both z1 and z2. In particular, if the Q-intercept is
the same in all states of nature, the duopoly has a Cournot equilibrium.
However, if the Q-intercept is su¢ ciently variable across the states of nature, and
rms di¤er in their information about it (including when z2  z1; i.e., rm 1 is
generally better informed than rm 2), a linear duopoly may not have a Cournot
equilibrium as we show next.
Consider the following duopoly with asymmetric information. The set of states
of nature 
 consists of just two states, !1 and !2; where the probability of !1 is 14 ;
and the probability of !2 is 34 : Firm 1 is completely informed about the realized state
of nature, while rm 2 has no information about it. Thus, z2 = f
;?g  z1 =
ff!1g ; f!2g ;
;?g : The inverse demand function is given by
P (!1; Q) = maxf1  Q
4
; 0g, and P (!2; Q) = maxf1 Q; 0g: (4)
Thus, here both P (!1; ) and P (!2; ) are linear till they reach zero; the Q-intercept
of P equals 4 at !1; and 1 at !2. Only rm 1 knows the Q-intercept of P at every
state of nature.
Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 0:001 at both states of nature. The
marginal cost for rm 1 is 0:001 at !2; but it is 2 at !1.
We will show that no Cournot equilibrium exists in this duopoly. Indeed, suppose
to the contrary that an equilibrium does exist, and denote it by q = (q1; q
2
): Since
at !1 the marginal revenue of rm 1 is always below its marginal cost, at this state it
always produces zero in equilibrium. It follows that both q1 and q
2
 can be regarded
as scalars: q1 can be viewed as the quantity produced by rm 1 at state !2; and q
2

as the quantity produced by rm 2 at both states.
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Consider rst the possibility that
q2 < 0:999: (5)
Since q1 maximizes 
1(; q2) and the output is zero at state !1; obviously
q1 2 arg max
q12[0;1 q2]
1
 
!2; (q
1; q2)

;
where 1 (!2; (q1; q2)) = q
1(1   q1   q2)   0:001q1: The unique maximizer q1 = q1
solves the rst order condition:
0 =
@
@q1

q1(1  q1   q2)  0:001q1

= 0:999  q2   2q1;
and consequently
q1 =
0:999  q2
2
: (6)
It follows that q1 + q
2
 < 1: Thus, similarly,
q2 2 arg max
q22[0;1 q1)
2(q1; q
2);
where
2(q1; q
2) =
1
4
2
 
!1; (0; q
2)

+
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; q
2)

=
1
4
q2(1  q
2
4
) +
3
4
q2(1  q1   q2)  0:001q2:
The unique maximizer q2 = q2 solves the rst order condition:
0 =
@
@q2

1
4
q2(1  q
2
4
) +
3
4
q2(1  q1   q2)  0:001q2

= 0:999  3
4
q1  
1
8
q2   3
2
q2
and it follows that
q2 =
0:999  3
4
q1
13
8
: (7)
Solving (6) and (7) yields
q1 = 0:249 75 (8)
and
q2 = 0:499 5: (9)
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Now note that
2(q1; q
2
) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 0:499 5)) +
3
4
2 (!2; (0:249 75; 0:499 5))
=
1
4
 0:499 5 

1  0:499 5
4

+
3
4
 0:499 5  (1  0:499 5  0:249 75)  0:001  0:4995
= 0:202 72:
However, since q1 + 2 > 1; we have
2(q1; 2) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 2)) +
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; 2)

(10)
=
1
4
 2  (1  2
4
)  2  0:001
= 0:248:
Thus
2(q1; 2) > 
2(q1; q
2
);
which shows that (5) does not hold in equilibrium.8
Next assume that
0:999  q2  1: (11)
Clearly
2(q1; q
2
) =
1
4
2
 
!1; (0; q
2
)

+
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; q
2
)

 1
4


1  0:999
4

+
3
4
 (1  0:999)
= 0:188 31:
On the other hand, just as in (10), 2(q1; 2) = 0:248: Consequently,
2(q1; 2) > 
2(q1; q
2
)
and thus (11) does not hold in equilibrium either.
We are left with the possibility that
q2 > 1: (12)
8Had we not disallowed negative prices in (4), the pair (q1; q
2
) given by (8) and (9) would have
in fact been a Cournot equilibrium in the duopoy: the deviation of rm 2 from q2 to 2 would not
have been protable. We will return to this point in the beginning of Section 4.
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But then
q2 2 arg max
q22(1;4)
2(q1; q
2);
where
2(q1; q
2) =
1
4
2
 
!1; (0; q
2)

+
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; q
2)

=
1
4
q2(1  q
2
4
)  0:001q2:
The unique maximizer q2 = q2 solves the rst order condition:
0 =
@
@q2

1
4
q2(1  q
2
4
)  0:001q2

= 0:249  q
2
8
;
which yields q2 = 1: 992: It follows that q
1
 = 0 (rm 1 would clearly prefer not to
produce for revenue zero, and save its costs instead). Now
2(q1; q
2
) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 1:992)) +
3
4
2 (!2; (0; 1:992))
=
1
4
 1:992 

1  1:992
4

  0:001  1:992
= 0:248004:
On the other hand,
2(q1; 0:5) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 0:5)) +
3
4
2 (!2; (0; 0:5))
=
1
4
 0: 5 

1  0:5
4

+
3
4
 0: 5  (1  0: 5)  0:001  0:5
= 0:296 38:
Thus
2(q1; 0:5) > 
2(q1; q
2
)
and it follows that (12) does not hold in equilibrium.
Since neither (5), (11), or (12) hold in an equilibrium, we have reached a contra-
diction. We conclude that there exists no Cournot equilibrium in this duopoly.
Remark 1 (Non-Existence of Cournot Equilibrium with Nearly Com-
plete Information). Cournot equilibrium may fail to exist even in an industry with
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nearly complete information. Indeed, suppose that the scenario described in Example
1 takes place with (small) probability " > 0; and that, with complementary probabil-
ity 1  "; rms know the inverse demand function and their costs. More precisely, let
us assume that !1; !2 2 
, (f!1g) = 14" and (f!2g) = 34"; f!1; !2g 2 z1\z2; rm
1 can distinguish between !1 and !2 while rm 2 cannot, and at each ! 2 
n f!1; !2g
both rms know the inverse demand function and their cost functions. On f!1; !2g ;
let the inverse demand function and the cost functions be the same as in the previous
example. Then the same arguments as above show that no Cournot equilibrium exists
in this duopoly. (One has to replace throughout the expected payo¤ function i of
rm i by its expected prot i conditional on A = f!1; !2g ; and all the contradic-
tions would now be obtained from the equivalent denition of a Cournot equilibrium
in (2).) 
Remark 2 (Non-Existence of Cournot Equilibrium With a Constant
Slope of the Inverse Demand Function). In Example 1, the vertical (P -)intercept
of the inverse demand function is xed at 1 across all states of nature, while the slope
of the demand (and the Q-intercept) are variable. A trivial modication of this
duopoly can yield an example of equilibrium non-existence, in which at all states of
nature the inverse demand function has a constant slope of  1 when it is positive
(but its P -intercept is variable). Simply multiply the function P (!1; ) by 4 at state
!1; to obtain a new P (!1; Q) = maxf4 Q; 0g with slope  1 on

0; Q (!1)

: To o¤set
the four-fold increase of P (!1; ) and to keep all previous arguments working, divide
the probability of !1 by 4 (and then normalize the vector
 
1
4
 (f!1g) ;  (f!2g)

= 
1
16
; 3
4

to obtain new probabilities
 
1
13
; 12
13

for the two states of nature). 
3.2 Example 2: Piecewise-Linear Duopoly
In the previous subsection, rms di¤ered in their information about the Q-intercept of
P:However, outside the linear case, even the complete knowledge of theQ-intercept by
both rms does not guarantee equilibrium existence in a duopoly. In this subsection
we adopt the same duopoly as before, with just one di¤erence: the inverse demand
10
function at state !1 is given by
P (!1; Q) =
8>><>>:
1; if Q  0:99;
100(1 Q) if 0:99 < Q  1;
0 otherwise.
Note that P (!1; ) is piecewise-linear and concave, before it reaches zero. Addition-
ally, the function P (!1; ) can be made smooth in a small neighborhood of Q = 0:99;
without a¤ecting any of our arguments in the sequel.9 Note also that each rm knows
the Q-intercept of P , Q  1; at any state of nature.
We will show that this duopoly does not have a Cournot equilibrium. Indeed,
suppose to the contrary that an equilibrium does exist, and denote it by q = (q1; q
2
):
As before, rm 1 produces zero quantity at !1, and it follows that both q1 and q
2
 can
be regarded as scalars: q1 can be viewed as the quantity produced by rm 1 at state
!2; and q2 as the quantity produced by rm 2 at both states.
Consider rst the possibility that
q1 + q
2
 < 0:99: (13)
Just as in the previous subsection,
q1 2 arg max
q12[0;1 q2]
1
 
!2; (q
1; q2)

; (14)
and therefore
q1 =
0:999  q2
2
: (15)
On the other hand,
q2 2 arg max
q22[0;0:99 q1)
2(q1; q
2);
where
2(q1; q
2) =
1
4
2
 
!1; (0; q
2)

+
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; q
2)

=
1
4
q2 +
3
4
q2(1  q1   q2)  0:001q2:
9We have not done this smoothing of P (!1; ) in order to simplify the presentation. Also note that
P (!1; ) can be made strictly decreasing on [0; 1] by adding to it a function " (Q)  0:001 (1 Q) :
Again, doing this would not qualitatively a¤ect any of our arguments, but would make the presen-
tation messier.
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The unique maximizer q2 = q2 solves the rst order condition:
0 =
@
@q2

1
4
q2 +
3
4
q2(1  q1   q2)  0:001q2

= 0:999  3
4
q1  
3
2
q2;
and it follows that
q2 =
0:999  3
4
q1
3
2
: (16)
Solving (15) and (16) yields
q1 = 0:222 (17)
and
q2 = 0:555: (18)
Now note that
2(q1; q
2
) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 0:555)) +
3
4
2 (!2; (0:222; 0:555))
=
1
4
 0:555 + 3
4
 0:555  (1  0:777)  0:001  0:555
= 0:23102:
However,
2(q1; 0:99) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 0:99)) +
3
4
2 (!2; (0:222; 0:99))
=
1
4
 0:99  0:99  0:001
= 0:24651:
Thus
2(q1; 0:99) > 
2(q1; q
2
);
which shows that (13) does not hold in an equilibrium.
Now assume that
0:99  q1 + q2 < 1: (19)
Just as before, (14) and thus (15) still hold. It follows that q2 = 0:999   2q1; and
thus
0:99  q1 + (0:999  2q1) = 0:999  q1:
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Therefore
q1  0:009;
and
q2  0:99  0:009 = 0:981:
Notice that then
2(q1; q
2
) =
1
4
2
 
!1; (0; q
2
)

+
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; q
2
)

 1
4
+
3
4
 (1  0:981)
= 0:264 25:
On the other hand,
2(q1; 0:5) =
1
4
2 (!1; (0; 0:5)) +
3
4
2
 
!2; (q
1
; 0:5)

 1
4
 0:5 + 3
4
 0:5  (1  0:5  0:009)  0:001  0:5
= 0:308 63
It follows that
2(q1; 0:5) > 
2(q1; q
2
);
and thus (19) does not hold in equilibrium either.
We are left with the possibility that
q1 + q
2
  1: (20)
However, this is also impossible. Since the revenue of each rm is zero at this level
of aggregate output, one of the rms will be better o¤ by switching its output level
to zero, thereby saving its costs.
Since neither (13), (19), or (20) hold in an equilibrium, we have reached a contra-
diction. We conclude that there exists no Cournot equilibrium in this duopoly.
Remark 3. In both previous examples it was assumed that the marginal cost of
production of rm 1 at state !1 is 2; which forces rm 1 to produce zero at this state.
This assumption is made only for simplicity and clarity of the proof, since it allows
to identify the equilibrium strategy of rm 1 with a scalar, representing its output
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at state !2: However, what is needed for our arguments to work is that the quantity
produced by 1 at !1 be su¢ ciently small. For instance, a Cournot equilibrium cannot
exist either when the marginal costs of rm 1 at !1 are very low for q 2 [0; 0:001];
but exceed 2 for q 2 [0:002;1): 
4 Existence and Uniqueness of Cournot Equilib-
rium in Oligopolies with (Possibly) Negative Prices
According to condition (ii), the inverse demand function is non-negative: once the
price reaches zero for some level Q(!) of aggregate output at some state of nature !,
it remains zero for all levels of output higher than Q(!). In this section we do not
insist on prices being non-negative, replacing condition (ii) by (ii)below:
(ii)there exists a positive real number Z such that P (!;Z)  0 for every ! 2 

and everyQ  Z;moreover, for every ! 2 
 the function P (!; ) is twice continuously
di¤erentiable and
QP 00 (!;Q) + P 0 (!;Q)  0 (21)
for every Q 2 R+ (at Q = 0 we have in mind the right-side derivatives of P and P 0).
Inequality (21) is borrowed from Novshek (1985)10; it is satised, e.g., by all
inverse demand functions which are concave on R+: Typically, condition (ii)implies
that the price P is negative when the aggregate output is su¢ ciently high. This
assumption is reasonable in certain contexts, and, as we shall see below, it is important
in guaranteeing existence of Cournot equilibrium. Results that we present in this
section will be instrumental in proving equilibrium existence under certain conditions
in oligopolies with non-negative prices, that will be the topic of the next section,
where condition (ii) will be reinstated.
10We could not have assumed instead the log-concavity of each P (!; ); thereby adopting the
condition of Amir (1996) from complete information duopolies. As we shall see in the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2, (21) implies certain properties of the state-dependent revenue function (decreasing
di¤erences, concavity), that fully translate into the same properties of the expected revenue function.
This would not have been the case for log-concave P (!; ):
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Allowing prices to be negative by means of condition (ii)has far reaching implica-
tions for the existence of Cournot equilibrium. Take, for instance, the two examples
of duopolies without an equilibrium in Section 3. The candidatesq = (q1; q
2
) for
an equilibrium (given by (8) and (9) for the duopoly in Example 1; and by (17) and
(18) for the duopoly in Example 2), that were found by solving equations obtained
from the rst-order conditions, were later disqualied from being equilibria. This was
because a protable deviation existed for the least informed rm 2, in which it chose
a large output, for which the price became zero at one of the states of nature. But,
had we not restricted the prices not to fall below zero in our denition of the inverse
demand function P; q = (q1; q
2
) would have been an equilibrium in each duopoly!
Firm 2 would have been deterred from deviations to very large outputs, because neg-
ative prices in some states of nature would ensue. This deterrence from choosing
large outputs, achieved by means of possibly negative prices, provides some intuition
as for why quite general positive results for equilibrium existence can be obtained for
oligopolies satisfying (ii). More formally, it is the "nice" behavior of the expected
payo¤ functions (submodularity, or concavity) that stands behind these equilibrium
existence results for oligopolies with possibly negative prices. When prices are con-
strained to be non-negative, the di¤erentiability conditions embodied in (ii)break
up very abruptly at the point where the price becomes zero, and the expected payo¤
functions lose some of these "nice" properties as a result.
The following condition will be used in the sequel:
(iv) P is bounded on the interval [0; nZ] uniformly in !; i.e., sup!2
;0QnZ jP (!;Q)j
< 1:
Theorem 1. In a duopoly satisfying (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), a Cournot equilibrium
exists.
Proof. We will show rst that for each ! 2 
 the prot function 1! () = 1 (!; )
of rm 1 has decreasing di¤erences in the rst coordinate, that is, if x1  x2  0 and
y1  y2  0; then
1! (x1; y2)  1! (x2; y2)
  1! (x1; y1)  1! (x2; y1)  0; (22)
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i.e.,
[x1P (!; x1 + y2)  x2P (!; x2 + y2)]  [x1P (!; x1 + y1)  x2P (!; x2 + y1)]  0:
Since P (!; ) is continuously di¤erentiable, this condition is equivalent to
@
@y2
[x1P (!; x1 + y2)  x2P (!; x2 + y2)]  0;
or
x1P
0 (!; x1 + y2)  x2P 0 (!; x2 + y2)  0;
for every x1  x2  0 and y2  0: This condition, in turn, is equivalent (since P 0 (!; )
is also continuously di¤erentiable) to
@
@x2
[x2P
0 (!; x2 + y2)]  0;
or
x2P
00 (!; x2 + y2) + P 0 (!; x2 + y2)  0; (23)
for every x2  0 and y2  0: However, (23) is implied by conditions (i) and (ii)on
P .
From (22) it follows that the expected prot function 1 of rm 1 also has decreas-
ing di¤erences in the rst coordinate: for every (q1; q2) ; (eq1; eq2) 2 L+1 (
;z1; ) 
L+1 (
;z2; ) such that q1  eq1, q2  eq2;
1
 
q1; eq2  1  eq1; eq2  1  q1; q2  1  eq1; q2  0:
Similarly, the expected payo¤ function 2 of rm 2 has decreasing di¤erences in the
second coordinate.
Now denote the constant function on 
 which is xed at the level Z by the
same symbol, Z. Consider intervals S1 = [0; Z]  L+1 (
;z1; ) ; and S2 = [0; Z] 
L+1 (
;z2; ) : Note that each function i; restricted to S1S2; is kk1-continuous in
both coordinates. Indeed, if a sequence f(q1n; q2n)g1n=1 in S1  S2 converges to (q1; q2)
with this norm on the coordinates, it has a subsequence
 
q1nk ; q
2
nk
	1
k=1
that converges
(-)almost everywhere to (q1; q2) : But then limk!1i
 
q1nk ; q
2
nk

= i (q1; q2) by the
bounded convergence theorem, since the state-dependent revenue and cost functions
are continuous and uniformly bounded (by conditions (iii) and (iv)). This obviously
implies continuity of i: According to Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990),
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this in turn implies order continuity of i; i.e., i converges along all convergent nets
of functions in S1  S2:
Now reverse the order in S2; i.e., replace the order with 0according to
which g 0 h if and only if h  g: Then both 1 and 2 exhibit increasing, rather
than decreasing, di¤erences. The reversal of order has no e¤ect on order continuity of
1 and 2: Since both S1 and S2 are complete lattices11, Theorem 5 of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) applies12: there exists a Cournot equilibrium when strategy proles
of the rms are restricted to be in S1S2: Denote one such equilibrium by (q1; q2) : If
(q1; q2) 2 L+1 (
;z1; )  L+1 (
;z2; ) ; notice that 1 (q1; q2)  1 (min(q1; Z); q2)
and 2 (q1; q
2)  2 (q1;min(q2; Z)) as follows from the denition of Z and condition
(iii). Therefore
1
 
q1; q
2

  1  min(q1; Z); q2  1  q1; q2
and
2
 
q1; q
2

  2  q1;min(q2; Z)  2  q1; q2 ;
since (q1; q
2
) is a Cournot equilibrium when the strategy proles of the rms are
restricted to S1  S2: But these inequalities show that (q1; q2) is actually a Cournot
equilibrium without any restrictions on strategies. 
When the set of states 
 is nite and all cost functions are convex, the existence
result of Theorem 1 holds for any number of rms.
Theorem 2. In an oligopoly satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii), a Cournot equilibrium
exists, provided 
 is a nite set and ci (!; ) is convex for every i 2 N and ! 2 
:
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Nash existence theorem. First, for
each ! 2 
; i! () = i (!; ) is concave in strategies of rm i. Indeed, the second
11As was mentioned already, this is due to Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
12One more thing needs to be veried before applying this theorem, namely that 1 is super-
modular in q1 for xed q2, i.e., for every q1; eq1 2 S1 and q2 2 S2; 1  q1; q2 + 1  eq1; q2 
1
 
max(q1; eq1); q2 + 1  min(q1; eq1); q2 ; and similarly for 2: However, it can be easily checked
that this inequality actually holds as equality.
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derivative of qi (!)P (!;Q (!)) with respect to qi (!) is equal to qi (!)P 00 (!;Q (!))+
2P 0 (!;Q (!)) ; which is non-positive as follows from (i) and (ii). Thus, qi (!)P (!;Q (!))
is concave in qi (!) ; and from convexity of ci (!; ) it follows that i! (q (!)) = qi (!)P (!;Q (!)) 
ci (!; q
i (!)) is also concave in qi (!) : The expected payo¤ function i clearly inherits
concavity in qi from i!.
Second, following notations of the proof of Theorem 1, restrict the strategy set
of each rm i to Si = [0; Z]  L+1 (
;zi; ) ; which is compact due to the nite-
ness of 
: As in the proof of Theorem 1, i is kk1-continuous13 in all coordinates
simultaneously on the compact cube [0; Z]N : Thus, all ingredients for the existence of
Nash equilibrium are in place, with the above restriction of strategies. However, the
restricted equilibrium is an equilibrium in the unrestricted oligopoly as well, which
can be shown again exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1. 
The following theorem establishes uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly
in which there are two types of rms, one of which possesses superior information.
Before stating the theorem, we introduce the following strengthened versions of con-
ditions (i) (combined with (iv)), and of (iii).
(i)For every ! 2 
 P (!; ) is strictly decreasing; moreover sup!2
;0QnZ+1 jP (!;Q)j
< 1 and14 sup!2
;0QnZ+1 jP 0(!;Q)j <1:
(iii)For every ! 2 
 and i 2 N; ci (!; ) is a strictly increasing, twice continu-
ously di¤erentiable and convex function, and ci (; q) 2 L+1 (
;z; ) for every q  0;
moreover supi2N;!2
;0qZ+1 c
0
i(!; q) <1:
Theorem 3. Consider an oligopoly satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii): Suppose further
that the set N of rms can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, K and M; such that
1 2 K; 2 2 M; and such that zi = z1; ci = c1 for every i 2 K; zj = z2; cj = c2 for
13Now condition (iv) is not needed, since due to the niteness of 
 P (!; ) is clearly bounded
uniformly in ! on any nite interval.
14Condition (i)will always be assumed in conjunction with (ii)or (ii)(to be introduced in the
next section), according to which P (!; ) is di¤erentiable.
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every j 2M; and z2  z1: Then, if a Cournot equilibrium exists (e.g., when either
n = 2 or the set 
 is nite)15, it is unique.
Proof. Let q = (qi)
n
i=1 be a Cournot equilibrium: The strategies in q are clearly
bounded by Z (beyond which all prices are non-positive by (ii)). Now pick a rm
i; and a set A 2 zi+. Denote by A+ 2 zi the subset of A on which qi > 0; and let
A0 = AnA+: Obviously,
E
 
qi ()P
 
;
X
j 6=i
qj () + qi ()
!
  ci
 ; qi () j A+! (24)
and
E
 
qi ()P
 
;
X
j 6=i
qj () + qi ()
!
  ci
 ; qi () j A0! (25)
are maximized (and in particular locally maximized) at qi = qi; provided A+; A0 2
zi+: Consequently, the boundedness of strategies in q; and our assumptions on the
uniform boundedness and continuity of P and the derivatives of P and ci (condi-
tions (i)and (iii)); imply by the bounded convergence theorem that Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are satised:
E
 
qi ()P 0 (; Q ()) + P (; Q ())  c0i
 ; qi () j A+ = 0
if A+ 2 zi+; and
E
 
qi ()P 0 (; Q ()) + P (; Q ())  c0i
 ; qi () j A0  0
if A0 2 zi+: Since this holds for every A 2 zi+; it follows that in fact
E
 
qi ()P 0 (; Q ()) + P (; Q ())  c0i
 ; qi () j zi (!) = 0 (26)
for almost every ! at which qi > 0; and
E
 
qi ()P 0 (; Q ()) + P (; Q ())  c0i
 ; qi () j zi (!)  0 (27)
for almost every ! at which qi = 0:
15These assumptions, together with (i), (ii), and (iii), imply conditions of either Theorem 1 or
Theorem 2.
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Note that for each ! 2 
 the function
F (q;Q) = qP 0 (!;Q) + P (!;Q)  c0i (!; q)
is decreasing in q and non-increasing in Q when q  Q: Indeed, @F
@q
= P 0 (!;Q)  
c00i (!; q) < 0 since P is decreasing and c is convex by (i) and (iii), and
@F
@Q
=
qP 00 (!;Q) +P 0 (!;Q)  0 as follows from (i)and (ii). Now suppose that q and q
are two Cournot equilibria: That F is decreasing in q and non-increasing in Q implies
that one cannot have 
qi; Q

<
 
qi; Q

or
 
qi; Q

>
 
qi; Q

(inequality in both coordinates and strict inequality16 in the rst coordinate) on a
set A 2 zi+: This is because otherwise conditions (26) and (27) would not hold
simultaneously for max ((qi; Q) ; (q
i
; Q)). To summarize, any rms equilibrium
strategy and the aggregate output in equilibrium cannot move in the same direction: 
qi; Q


 
qi; Q

and
 
qi; Q


 
qi; Q

(28)
on any set A 2 zi+.
We will next show that every Cournot equilibrium satises the equal treatment
property, i.e., that strategies of rms of the same type are equal. Indeed, if q is
a Cournot equilibrium, and qi 6= qj where i and j are rms of the same type (say,
1) then consider an n-tuple q obtained from q by interchanging i and j. Clearly,
q is also a Cournot equilibrium. However, if A 2 z1+ is a set on which w.l.o.g.
qi > q
j
 = q
i
; then the obvious fact that Q = Q leads to contradiction with (28).
Thus, the equal treatment property holds in any Cournot equilibrium.
Now suppose that q and q are Cournot equilibria in the oligopoly. We will
show that they coincide. Due to the equal treatment property, Q(!) = jKj q1 (!) +
jM j q2 (!) ; and it will su¢ ce to establish that qi = qi for i = 1; 2: If q2 and q2 are
not equal almost everywhere, then w.l.o.g.
q2 > q
2
 on some A 2 z2+. (29)
Consequently,
q1  q1 on A: (30)
16Recall that a strict inequality g > h (on A) means that  (f! 2 A j g (!)  h (!)g) = 0:
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Indeed, if (30) does not hold, there is B  A; B 2 z1+; with17 q1 > q1 on B: From
(29) also Q > Q on B; contradicting (28)):
Consider now the set D = f! 2 A j q1 (!) < q1 (!)g 2 z1: If D 2 z1+; Q  Q
on D (otherwise Q < Q on some E  D; E 2 z1+; contradicting (28)): And on
AnD; q1 = q1; and so Q  Q because of (29). We conclude that
Q  Q on the entire A: (31)
But then (29) and (31) contradict (28). Thus, strategies q2 and q
2
 must coincide
almost everywhere. However, if q1 di¤ers from q
1
 on some A 2 z1+, and w.l.o.g.
q1 > q
1
 on A; then Q > Q on A since q
2
 = q
2
; contradicting (28) again. We
conclude that q1 = q
1
 as well. 
5 Existence and Uniqueness of Cournot Equilib-
rium in Oligopolies with Non-negative Prices
In this section we bring back the condition of non-negativity of prices in the following
form, which combines (ii) with the Novshek (1985) condition:
(ii) there exists Q 2 L+1 (
;z; ) such that P (!;Q) = 0 for every ! 2 
 and
everyQ  Q (!) ;moreover, for every ! 2 
 the function P (!; ) is twice continuously
di¤erentiable18 on [0; Q(!)] and QP 00 (!;Q) + P 0 (!;Q)  0 on this interval.
According to the next Theorem 4, if for each rm i there exists a certain state-
dependent threshold of output, qi 2 L+1 (
;zi; ) ; which the rm will never desire to
exceed (it can never hurt rm i to switch to a strategy that does not exceed the level
qi), and if adhering to the thresholds by all rms guarantees positive prices at every
state of nature, then a Cournot equilibrium exists in an oligopoly under conditions
of Theorems 1 and 2 in the previous section. (Existence of such thresholds can be
guaranteed if marginal costs of rms increase su¢ ciently fast.)
17Here we use the fact that z1 is ner than z2:
18At the endpoints of the interval this refers to the continuity of one-side derivatives.
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Theorem 4. Consider an oligopoly satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii). Suppose further
that there exists
 
qi
n
i=1
2
nY
i=1
L+1 (
;zi; ) such that
nX
i=1
qi  Q; (32)
and such that
E
 
i (; q ()) j zi  E  i  ; q () j min  qi () ; qi () j zi (33)
for every n-tuple of strategies q = (qi)ni=1 and every i 2 N: Assume also that either
(1) n = 2; or (2) 
 is a nite set and ci (!; ) is convex for every i 2 N and ! 2 
:
Then a Cournot equilibrium exists.
Proof. First, restrict strategy sets of rms to be Si =

0; qi

: Note that for every
n-tuple of strategies q = (qi)ni=1 2 S1  :::  Sn; Q 
Pn
i=1 q
i  Q: Hence, strategy
proles in S1  :::  Sn have exactly the same properties as if the di¤erentiability
condition in (ii)held for all Q  0 (i.e., as if (ii)had the original form (ii)). Thus,
as in the proofs19 of Theorems 1 and 2 (where strategy sets of each rm were restricted
to have the form [0; Z]), there is a Cournot equilibrium q = (qi)
n
i=1 2 S1  :::  Sn
in the oligopoly, provided all unilateral deviations of i considered in (1) are in Si:
To show that q is a Cournot equilibrium in the unrestricted oligopoly as well, we
now prove that unilateral deviations of i to strategies outside Si are not protable.
Indeed, if qi is ith strategy which is not in Si; then
E
 
i
 ; q () j qi () j zi  E  i  ; q () j min  qi () ; qi () j zi
by (33), and
E
 
i
 ; q () j min  qi () ; qi () j zi  E  i; q () j zi
by (3), since min
 
qi () ; qi () 2 Si. This proves via (3) that q is indeed a Cournot
equilibrium of the oligopoly without restriction on strategies. 
19We do not need to assume condition (iv) here, although it was needed in the proof of Theorem
1. The reason is that it is implied by the combination of (i) and (ii).
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Remark 4. A closer look into the proof of Theorem 4 reveals that, in fact,
a weaker condition would su¢ ce for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium in an
oligopoly. Condition (33) could be replaced by the following:
Given any n-tuple of strategies q = (qi)ni=1 ; for every rm i there exists a strategy
ri  qi such that
E
 
i (; q ()) j zi  E  i  ; q () j ri () j zi : (34)
Thus, condition (34) is di¤erent from (33) in that min
 
qi () ; qi () is replaced by
a general ri  qi: rm i would prefer some strategy ri over qi =2 [0; qi]; and not
necessarily the strategy min
 
qi () ; qi () that simply reduces output to the level qi
whenever it exceeds qi. 
Remark 4 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider an oligopoly satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii). Suppose further
that there exists
 
qi
n
i=1
2
nY
i=1
L+1 (
;zi; ) such that (32) holds and such that
E
 
i
 ;  qi; 0 i j zi  0 (35)
for every i 2 N: (Here 0 i stands for the zero-output strategies of all rms but i; and
accordingly (35) is saying that the conditional expectation of the monopoly prot of
rm i under strategy qi, given its information, is non-positive in all states of nature:)
Assume also that either (1) n = 2; or (2) 
 is a nite set and ci (!; ) is convex for
every i 2 N and ! 2 
: Then a Cournot equilibrium exists.
Proof. Note that (35) implies condition (34) for the strategy ri which is equal
to 0 on A =

! j qi (!) > qi (!)	 2 zi; and to qi on Ac: Existence of a Cournot
equilibrium then follows by Remark 4. 
The following theorem gives a condition for equilibrium uniqueness, and is a coun-
terpart of Theorem 3 for oligopolies with possibly negative prices. Let us rst restate
(i)and (iii)in the form appropriate in the current setting of non-negative prices:
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(i)For every ! 2 
 P (!; ) is strictly decreasing on [0; Q(!)]; moreover sup!2
;0QQ jP (!;Q)j
< 1 and sup!2
;0QQ jP 0(!;Q)j <1:
(iii)For every ! 2 
 and i 2 N; ci (!; ) is a strictly increasing, twice continu-
ously di¤erentiable and convex function, and ci (; q) 2 L+1 (
;z; ) for every q  0;
moreover supi2N;!2
;0qsupQ+1 c
0
i(!; q) <1:
Theorem 5. Consider an oligopoly satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii); and assume
also that Q is strictly positive and measurable with respect to z2: 20 Suppose further
that the set N of rms can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, K and M; such that
1 2 K; 2 2 M; and such that zi = z1; ci = c1 for every i 2 K; zj = z2; cj = c2
for every j 2 M; and z2  z1: Then, if a Cournot equilibrium exists (e.g., under
conditions of either Theorem 4 or Remark 4) it is unique.
Proof. Note that if q = (qi)
n
i=1 is a Cournot equilibrium, then
Q < Q: (36)
Indeed, if not, consider the set A 2 z1+ on which Q  Q. If there exists a rm i 2 K
with qi > 0 on some B 2 z1+; B  A; then i would benet by switching its output to
zero on B and saving its costs, contradicting (2). And if for all i 2 K qi = 0 on A;
then
P
j2M q
j
 = Q  Q on A: But since both
P
j2M q
j
 and Q are z2-measurable,
there exists C 2 z2+ on which
P
j2M q
j
  Q (> 0): Accordingly, there exists a rm
i 2M with qi > 0 on some D 2 z2+; D  C; and just as before this means that i has
a protable deviation from q on D; contradicting (2). We conclude that (36) holds.
But if q and q are two Cournot equilibria, it follows from (36) that q; q;
and all strategy proles close to them21 have exactly the same properties as if the
20The last condition is new, and it did not appear in the statement of Theorem 3. It is needed
only when prices are not allowed to be negative. Indeed, without Qs measurability with respect to
both elds, there are counterexamples to uniqueness even if all rms have the same information, see
Lagerlöf (2006b).
21What we have in mind are strategy proles that constitute, at each state of nature, small
unilateral deviations from q or q:
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di¤erentiability condition in (ii)held for all Q  0 (i.e., as if (ii)had the original
form (ii)). We can therefore show that q and q coincide, just as in the proof of
Theorem 3, using the rst-order conditions derived from maximization of (24) and
(25). 
Example 3 (Duopoly with Linear Demand and Complete Information
on the Q-intercept). Let ;  2 L+1 (
;z; ) be strictly positive functions, and
assume moreover that  2 L+1 (
;z1; ) \ L+1 (
;z2; ) : Suppose that we have a
duopoly in which for any ! 2 
;
P (!;Q) = max f (!) ( (!) Q) ; 0g :
Here Q = : Since  is both z1- and z2-measurable, both rms know the Q-intercept
of P at every state of nature. This is di¤erent from the scenario in Example 1, where
a linear duopoly without a Cournot equilibrium was described. In that example Q
was not measurable with respect to the information eld of rm 2. As we shall see,
here the assumption of Q = s measurability with respect to both elds leads to a
di¤erent conclusion.
We claim that this duopoly possesses a Cournot equilibrium. Let q1 = q2  1
2
 2
L+1 (
;z1; ) \ L+1 (
;z2; ) : Clearly (q1; q2) satises (32) in Theorem 4. We show
next that condition (33) of that theorem also holds.
Let q = (q1; q2) 2 L+1 (
;z1; )L+1 (
;z2; ). If qi 2 [0; qi] for every i then (33)
is trivial, and so suppose that qi =2 [0; qi] for some rm i: We claim that then
E
 
i (; q ()) j zi (!)  E  i(; q () j qi ()) j zi (!) (37)
for almost every ! 2 A = ! j qi (!) > qi (!)	 2 zi: Note that for every ! 2 
 and
every x  qi (!) = 1
2
 (!) ; the following holds: either
@
@x
[xP (!; x+ y)  c(!; x)]   (!) ( (!)  2x)  @
@x
c(!; x) < 0;
if x+ y <  (!) ; or
@
@x
[xP (!; x+ y)  c(!; x)] =   @
@x
c(!; x) < 0;
if x+ y   (!) : Accordingly,
i (!; q (!)) < i
 
!; q (!) j qi (!)
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on A; and so (37) holds for almost every ! 2 A: Note that this establishes (33) on
A: On Ac; min
 
qi () ; qi () = qi () and thus (33) is trivial. We conclude that in a
duopoly with linear prices (33) holds for every q = (q1; q2) and every i = 1; 2.
But (32) and (33) imply, by Theorem 4, that the duopoly has a Cournot equilib-
rium.
Now assume in addition that z2  z1; and that the cost function of every rm i
is convex and twice continuously di¤erentiable. Then, by Theorem 5, this duopolys
Cournot equilibrium is unique. 
Example 4 (Non-Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium when no Firm
Holds Superior Information). Consider the duopoly in which 
 consists of three
states, !1, !2; and !3; each one is chosen by nature with equal probability. In terms
of information endowments, rm 1 cannot distinguish only between !1 and !2; and
rm 2 cannot distinguish only between !1 and !3: Thus z1 = ff!1; !2g ; f!3g ;?;
g,
and z2 = ff!1; !3g ; f!2g ;?;
g :
In both states of nature the rms face the same quadratic inverse demand function
P (Q) = maxf1 Q2; 0g:
Thus, rms know the inverse demand at every state of nature; they are, however,
asymmetrically informed about the costs. Lagerlöf (2006b) already showed an ex-
ample of equilibrium non-uniqueness with symmetrically informed rms but with
incomplete information on the inverse demand; our example will show that knowing
the inverse demand cannot guarantee uniqueness.
Assume further that rm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 0:01 at states !1 and
!2, while its marginal cost is 2 at !3: Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 0:01 at
states !1 and !3, while its marginal cost is 2 at !2:
Since at !3 the marginal revenue of rm 1 is always below its marginal cost, it
produces zero at this state in any equilibrium. Similarly, rm 2 produces zero at !2
in any equilibrium. It follows that in an equilibrium q = (q1; q
2
) both q
1
 and q
2
 can
be regarded as scalars: q1 can be viewed as the quantity produced by rm 1 at state
!1 (and thus also at !2); and q2 as the quantity produced by rm 2 at state !1 (and
thus also at !3).
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We claim that both
q = (q1; q
2
) =

3
10
p
2;
3
10
p
2

 (0:424 26; 0:424 26)
and
q = (q1; q
2
) =

7
30
p
6;
7
30
p
6

 (0:571 55; 0:571 55)
are Cournot equilibria in this duopoly.
First let us show that q is a Cournot equilibrium. For q 2 [0; 1  q1] the expected
payo¤ function of rm 2 when it uses strategy q is
2(q1; q) =
1
3
2
 
!1; (q
1
; q)

+
1
3
2
 
!2; (q
1
; 0)

+
1
3
2 (!3; (0; q))
=
1
3
q
 
1 

3
10
p
2 + q
2!
+
1
3
q
 
1  q2  2
3
0:01q;
and its unique maximum on [0; 1   q1] is indeed attained at q = q2 = 310
p
2: Thus
rm 2 has no incentive to deviate from q2 to another strategy in [0; 1  q1]: Now, for
q 2 [1  q1; 1],
2(q1; q) =
1
3
q
 
1  q2  2
3
0:01q:
The maximum of 1
3
q (1  q2)  2
3
0:01q on [1 q1; 1] is attained at q = 730
p
6  0:571 55:
This maximum is equal to 343
6750
p
6  0:124 47; and therefore rm 2 has no incentive to
deviate from q2 (that gives it a payo¤
2(q1; q
2
)  0:152 74) to a strategy in [1 q1; 1]:
Since strategies higher than 1 yield negative expected payo¤, we have shown that rm
2 will not deviate unilaterally from q: By symmetry, the same holds for rm 1, and
thus q is indeed a Cournot equilibrium.
We show next that q is a Cournot equilibrium. For q 2 [1  q1; 1] the expected
payo¤ function of rm 2 is
2(q1; q) =
1
3
q
 
1  q2  2
3
0:01q;
and as was said it is maximized at q = 7
30
p
6 = q2 (and 
2(q1; q
2
) =
343
6750
p
6 
0:124 47): Thus rm 2 has no incentive to deviate from q2 to another strategy in
[1  q1; 1]: Additionally, for q 2 [0; 1  q1],
2(q1; q) =
1
3
q
 
1 

7
30
p
6 + q
2!
+
1
3
q
 
1  q2  2
3
0:01q
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has a maximum at q  0:367 92 and the maximum is equal to  0:117 98: Again,
2 has no incentive to deviate from q2 to a strategy in [0; 1   q1]: Since strategies
higher than 1 yield expected negative payo¤, this shows that rm 2 will not deviate
unilaterally from q: By symmetry, the same holds for rm 1, and thus q is another
Cournot equilibrium of the duopoly. 
Remark 5 (Cournot Equilibrium Existence in Mixed Strategies). If
we were to allow mixed strategies of rms, existence of Cournot equilibrium would
follow from the Nash existence theorem under conditions (i)-(iii), at least when the
number of states of nature is nite. Indeed, no rm would ever choose with positive
probability, as its best response, quantities exceeding maxQ at any state of nature, in
order to avoid zero revenue (due to assumption (ii)) and to save its costs (due to (iii)).
Thus, w.l.o.g. we can assume that the set of (behavioral) mixed strategies of each
rm i is Si =

M(

0;maxQ

)
fi
; where M(

0;maxQ

) is the set of all probability
distributions on the interval

0;maxQ

; and fi is the maximal set of disjoint subsets
in the nite eld zi: The set M(

0;maxQ

) is compact in the weak topology on
measures (see Billingsley (1995)); and hence so is the product set Si: Since the inverse
demand function and the cost functions are continuous by (i) and (iii), the expected
payo¤ function of each rm is continuous in the product (weak) topology on
nY
i=1
Si:
The expected payo¤ function i of rm i is also (clearly) concave in its own mixed
strategies, si 2 Si: Consequently, a Cournot equilibrium exists in an oligopoly due to
the Nash existence theorem. 
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